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ABSTRACT 
This paper empirically examines the issue of fiscal policy sustainability in Indonesia. To do so, we first 
diagnose the Indonesia’s public finance by analysing the evolution of key fiscal indicators—debt, budget 
deficit, revenue and expenditure—over time. It is found that the fiscal policy in Indonesia has been 
responsible and conservative. The budget deficit has been maintained below 3 percent of GDP with a 
decreasing trend in public debt-to-GDP ratio since 2001 to present. We then test the fiscal sustainability 
based on the government intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) framework using the data set covering 
the period of 1982 – 2010. The IBC framework requires the stationarity of public debt and total deficit as 
well as cointegration of government revenues and expenditures. We find that all the variables of interest 
are stationary, which favouring a conclusion that fiscal policy in Indonesia has been sustainable during 
the sample period. We proceed by analysing the nexus of the government revenue and expenditure. The 
results from the Granger causality test and the generalised impulse response function are consistent with 
the Friedman’s (1978) tax-and-spend hypothesis, that government revenue Granger causes government 
expenditure positively. We also find that a shock in expenditure lead to a worsening budget deficit 
Therefore, in controlling budget deficit and sustaining fiscal sustainability, the fiscal authorities in 
Indonesia should pursue robust fiscal policy aimed at raising revenue and controlling expenditure.   
 
Field of Research:  Public finance, fiscal policy sustainability, Causality, Impulse response, Indonesia. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Sustainable fiscal policy is a key for a stable macroeconomic environment and a sustainable economy. It 
is related to the issue of whether the government is capable of sustaining a given spending, taxation, 
and borrowing pattern indefinitely, or whether it will be ultimately constrained to alter those policy 
settings to satisfy its long run budget constraint (Abdulnasser, 2000).  A sustainable fiscal policy, 
according to Blanchard (1990), is the one that can be continued indefinitely with a stable government 
debt-to-GDP ratio. Meanwhile, in the government intertemporal budget constraint framework, a fiscal 
policy is sustainable if the current value of government debt is less than or equals the sum of discounted 
future government surpluses, implying that the government is not financing its activities through a Ponzi 
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scheme (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986). In this sense, a persistently large budget deficit which leading to an 
ever rising public debt to GDP ratio is a symptom of an unsustainable fiscal policy (Burger, 2005).When 
the market realises that the higher debt servicing costs will make it more difficult for the government to 
meet its budget constraint, which in turn will cause adverse effects to the economy. Domar (1944) 
expressed a concern about the importance of fiscal policy sustainability as follows: “… continuous 
government borrowing results in an ever rising public debt, the servicing of which will require higher and 
higher taxes; and that the latter will eventually destroy our economy or result in outright repudiation of 
the debt”. 
The issue of fiscal policy sustainability is a recurrent issue and it has received much attention lately 
following the recent global financial and economic crisis since mid-2007. In response to the crisis, many 
countries have adopted countercyclical fiscal policy by introducing fiscal stimulus through increasing 
expenditure and lowering taxes. Over 2009 – 2010, fiscal stimulus packages averaging about 4 percent 
of GDP have been implemented by the G-20 countries (IMF, 2009). The purpose is to generate economic 
activities during the economic slowdown and, hence, preventing the economies from falling further. It is 
widely believed that fiscal stimulus packages have made a significance contribution to the economic 
recovery (Adams et al., 2010; Bevan, 2010; Hur et al., 2010). However, while such a fiscal activism has 
helped to alleviate the adverse impacts of the crisis, in the process it may lead to increases in fiscal 
deficits and public debts, which raises concern about fiscal sustainability. According to IMF (2009), as the 
result of countercyclical fiscal measures, it is expected that fiscal balances will be weaker by almost 6 
percentage points of GDP and government debt will rise by 14 percentage points of GDP in 2009 in G-20 
countries. Tanzi (2010) argues that the stimulus packages contributed to the perception that the fiscal 
deterioration created by the crisis would not be cyclical but long lasting and would have major 
consequences for the role that governments would play in the economy in years to come.  
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, this paper aims to test for the sustainability of fiscal policy in 
Indonesia. Since the Asian financial crisis 1997/98, the government has implemented various fiscal 
consolidation measures in order to pursue fiscal sustainability, while also seeking to provide fiscal 
stimulus to support economic growth. As the results, the budget deficit has been consistently 
maintained below 3 percent of GDP since 2000, and the public debt to GDP ratio has consistently 
declined since 2001. Hence, Indonesia entered the recent global economic crisis which started in mid-
2007 with better fiscal condition than many Asian countries, or even the US and Europe. This may be an 
indication that fiscal policy in Indonesia has been sustainable. However, we are interested in checking 
the sustainability formally, and in doing so we test the time series properties of the variables of interest 
derived from the government intertemporal budget constraint (IBC).  
Secondly, this paper aims to test the causal relationship between government revenue and expenditure. 
As described in Burger (2005), the cause of fiscal policy unsustainability lies in the difference between 
the levels (and not the composition) of expenditure and revenue, namely the budget deficit. This implies 
that the direct cure for an unsustainable fiscal policy is to control budget deficit. Accordingly, a number 
of theoretical studies have developed several approaches to control the budget deficit, including the 
causality hypothesis between government revenue and expenditure which specifies whether 
government should control the budgetary deficit by adjusting expenditure, or by adjusting revenue, or 
by employing both corrective measures simultaneously. For instance, if the causality extends from 
revenue to expenditure, a deficit can be more effectively controlled by adjusting expenditure than by 
adjusting revenue as an increase in revenue would trigger an increase in expenditure and, therefore, not 
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lead to a reduction of deficit in subsequent period (Martin et al., 2005). To test the causality relationship 
between revenue and expenditure we utilise the Granger causality/Block exogeneity Wald test based on 
the results from a vector autoregression (VAR) model. To determine whether the causality is positive 
and negative, we complement the causality test with the generalised impulse response analysis. 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC FINANCE IN INDONESIA 
Figure 1 shows the development in government revenue, expenditure, and overall budget deficit ratios 
to GDP in Indonesia during 1982 – 2010. In this sample period, the government revenue and 
expenditure to GDP ratios have fluctuated with average of 17.3 and 18.7 percent of GDP respectively, 
while the average of overall budget deficit is 1.4 percent of GDP. There is a period of budget surplus in 
1994 – 1997, four years before Indonesia mired in an economic crisis in 1997/98. 
The public debt to GDP ratio (see Figure 2) ranges from 18.56 percent in 1982 to 95.90 percent in 1999, 
averaged 44.67 percent. In 1982 – 1996, the period before the Asian financial crisis, the average of 
public debt to GDP ratio is 35.25 percent with an increasing trend during 1982 – 1987 and a decreasing 
trend during 1987 – 1997. Following the Asian crisis, the debt to GDP ratio increased rapidly from 26.41 
percent in 1997 to reach its peak at 95.90 percent in 1999. This rapid increased in debt to GDP ratio can 
be attributed to the cost of providing liquidity and eventually the take-over of the collapsing banking 
system. Since 2001, the debt to GDP ratio has consistently decreased. In 2010, the debt to GDP ratio has 
reached 27 percent of GDP.  
 
Figure 1: Revenue, Expenditure, and Deficit (% GDP) 
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Figure 2: Public Debt (% GDP) 
 
 
During 1982 – 1995, the ratio of government expenditure to GDP had been fluctuated with a declining 
trend. On average, the government expenditure to GDP ratio was 19.26 percent of GDP, with the 
highest 23.59 percent in 1983 and the lowest 14.68 percent in 1995. The government revenue to GDP 
ratio had also been fluctuated, but relatively more stable compared to the expenditure. The average 
government revenue to GDP ratio was 17.47 percent, with the highest 19.88 percent in 1983 and the 
lowest, ever, 15.37 percent of GDP in 1988. As the result, the overall budget deficit on average had been 
deficit, however with a declining trend. The average budget deficit was 1.79 percent of GDP. The largest 
budget deficit was 5 percent of GDP in 1983 (see Figure xxx). The declining trend in the budget deficit 
during 1982 – 1995 reflects that the fiscal policy was responsible and conservative with a strong 
willingness to pursue fiscal consolidation. In fact, during 1994 – 1997, four years prior to the Asian 
economic crisis, Indonesia recorded a moderate budget surplus of 1 – 3 percent of GDP (average of 1.4 
percent of GDP). 
In 1997/98, the Asia financial crisis severely hit the Indonesia’s economy. The economy shrank by over 
13 percent of GDP in 1998. Public debt increased dramatically in 1998 and reached almost 100 percent 
of GDP in 1999, which can be attributed to the cost of providing liquidity and eventually the take-over of 
the collapsing banking system. Nevertheless, fiscal policy continued on a responsible and conservative 
track and acted as anchor for the whole economy (Blöndal et al., 2009). Even during the height of the 
fiscal crisis (1998-1999), deficits were modest, reaching a high of 1.69 percent of GDP in 1998 and 2.5 
percent of GDP in 1999. In fact, the prudent budget policy is generally seen as having been instrumental 
in the economic recovery. This situation was the result of major expenditure cuts—largely in public 
investment and other development expenditures—to offset lower levels of revenue and raising interest 
expenditures to finance the growing level of public debt. In 2000, in spite less favourable economic and 
political developments, the government brought fiscal deficit under control quickly. The ﬁscal deﬁcit had 
fallen to less than 2 percent of GDP by 2000, and it has remained there for most years since (Hill and 
Shirasi, 2007). 
Since 2001, the focus of the government’s fiscal policy has been to promote fiscal consolidation and 
reduce government debt gradually in order to achieve fiscal sustainability. As a result of the overall 
macroeconomic situation and current policy challenges, since 2006, the government has also focused 
fiscal policy on providing a modest degree of stimulus to the overall economy, within the constraints of 
the government’s overall fiscal situation. 
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During 2001-2005 the fiscal policy was mainly oriented toward fiscal consolidation as reflected by a 
declining trend in the budget deficit to GDP ratio. As can be seen in Figure 1, while the revenue and 
expenditure to GDP ratios were fluctuated, the budget deficit gradually declined from 2.5 percent of 
GDP in 2001 to 0.5 percent of GDP in 2005. The fiscal conservatism during this period can be attributed 
to: (i) the adoption of the IMF-supported stabilization programme under which the government was 
required to consolidate its budget by bringing down the deficit, and; (ii) the adoption of the fiscal rule 
based on the government regulation No. 23/2003, which caps the fiscal deficit at 3 percent of GDP and 
accumulated debt at 60 percent of GDP.  
Fiscal consolidation and solid economic growth helped to reduce the ratio of public debt to GDP ratio. In 
2001, the public debt to GDP decreased to about 80 percent of GDP as compared to 95 percent of GDP 
in 2000. Since then, the debt to GDP ratio consistently decreases. In 2005, the debt to GDP reached the 
level of 46 percent of GDP. 
Some important measures undertaken to enhance fiscal consolidation included: (1) continued tax and 
custom reforms to increase revenue, and also to lessen dependence on volatile oil and gas receipts; (2) 
streamlined expenditures, including limitations on fuel subsidies, and; (3) gradual reduction in 
government debt. Once fiscal consolidation was achieved in 2005, the government could afford a pro-
growth fiscal policy.  
During 2006 – 2009, an increasing trend in the budget deficit suggests that the fiscal policy was mainly 
oriented toward fiscal stimulus, while still consistently maintaining longer run fiscal sustainability. In this 
period, the government revenue and expenditure were respectively averaged on 17.5 and 18.5 percent 
of GDP. Meanwhile, the budget deficit increased from 0.87 percent of GDP in 2006 to 1.58 percent of 
GDP in 2009, with average of 0.95 percent of GDP. Fiscal stimulus was aimed at supporting the 
economic growth and then at preventing economic slowdown following the global financial crisis started 
that in 2008. Fiscal stimulus was introduced in forms of: (1) various tax and non-tax fiscal incentives 
(such as reduction in personal and corporate income tax rates, import duty waivers for raw materials 
and capital goods, and diesel and electricity subsidies) aimed at raising production activities and 
investment; (2) transfer payment aimed at maintaining households’ purchasing power, and; (3) 
increased expenditures on both government consumption and investment aimed at strengthening the 
real sector, job creation and mitigation of job losses; (4) along with increasing the education budget. 
Meanwhile, the government keeps managing to reduce the debt to GDP ratio. During this period, the 
debt to GDP ratio has decreased from 40 percent in 2006 to 27 percent in 2010, which is lower than the 
original target of 40 percent of GDP by the end of 2009. This achievement has been made possible by 
lower growth of new debt as compared to economic growth.  
In summary, the fiscal policy in Indonesia during the sample period has been responsible and 
conservative aimed at balancing between fiscal consolidation and fiscal stimulus concerns. The trend in 
conservative policymaking has been officially confirmed in the government regulation No. 2003 which 
caps the fiscal deficit at 3 percent of GDP and accumulated debt at 60 percent of GDP. After the 1997/98 
economic crisis, the budget deficit has been consistently maintained below 3 percent of GDP and the 
public debt to GDP ratio has consistently declined since 2001 to reach 27 percent of GDP in 2010. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Fiscal policy sustainability concept 
Since the seminal paper of Hamilton and Flavin (1986), fiscal sustainability analyses mostly started with 
a representative agent model in which the government must satisfy an intertemporal budget constraint 
(IBC) and, in every period, a static budget constraint (Chalk and Hemming 2000). Within this framework, 
fiscal policy is sustainable if the expected present value of all future primary surpluses equals the current 
level of public debt. The IBC can be derived from an identity of budget constraint that links the primary 
balance to revenue, expenditure and public debt as the following: 
  
1 1
1(1 )
t t t t t t
t t t t t
B B G R rB
B G R r B
 

   
   
       (1) 
where tG  is the primary government expenditure (i.e., government expenditure on goods and services 
excluding interest payments), tB  is the stock of debt at the end of period, tGR  is the government 
revenues, tr  is the one-period (average) interest rate on government debt issued at the end of last 
period, and 1t trB   is interest payments made in current period. Equation (1) states that government 
budget deficit 1t t t tG GR rB    must be financed by issuing new debt, and that the size of the current 
government debt is equal to the accumulation of the current and past budget deficits.  
 
Since (1) should hold in each period, the intertemporal budget constraint can be obtained by performing 
recursive iteration as the following: 
 
  
1 1
1
1 1
( ) lim
(1 )
(1 )
k
t t k t k t kk k
k j t j
t j
j
B R G B
r
r

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
  


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

 

    (2) 
 
Assuming that the interest rate is stationary and then taking expectation in the equation, the IBC can be 
rewritten as follows: 
 
  
1 1
1
lim
(1 ) (1 )
t k t k t k
t t tk kk
k
R G B
B E E
r r

  
 


 
 
      (3) 
 
According to (3), whether fiscal policy is sustainable or not depends on the development of the present 
value of public debt, i.e. the second term of the right hand side of (3). A sustainable fiscal policy should 
ensure that the present value of the stock of debt goes to zero in infinity, that is 
 
  
1
lim 0
(1 )
t k
t kk
B
E
r




        (4) 
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Equation (4) is known as the transversality condition, which implies a no Ponzi game 1 and stating that 
the growth rate of public debt should not be larger than the interest rate. If the transversality condition 
is satisfied, then the IBC becomes: 
  
1
1 (1 )
t k t k
t t k
k
R G
B E
r

 





         (5) 
 
This equation says that a fiscal policy is sustainable if the present discounted value of the primary 
surplus is equal to the current level of public debt. In other words, this solvency condition states that, 
for a fiscal policy to be sustainable, a government that has debt outstanding will have to run primary 
budget surpluses in the future. Those surpluses should be large enough to satisfy equation (5). 
 
3.2 Tests of Fiscal Sustainability 
 
Many studies have tested fiscal policy sustainability for various countries since the early 1980s, when 
most countries experienced high levels of government debt and primary deficit. Two methods, based on 
the intertemporal budget constraint, appear to be worth pursuing. One method is to test past fiscal data 
to see if government debt and/or deficit follow a stationary process, along the lines suggested by the 
pioneer Hamilton and Flavin (1986). The other is to implement cointegration tests of government 
revenues and expenditures, following Trehan and Walsh (1988), Hakkio and Rush (1991), and Bohn 
(1998, 2008). 
 
The work by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) is a pioneer in testing fiscal policy sustainability. Assuming 
constant real interest rates, they argue that a sufficient condition 2 for fiscal policy sustainability is that 
the primary balance, and therefore that public debt stock, is a stationary series. They derive a testable 
equation based on (2) as follows: 
    0
1
1
(1 )
(1 )
t
t t t k t k tk
k
B E R G A r
r


 

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
      (6) 
where 0
0
lim
(1 )
t k
t kk
B
A E
r




and t  is an error term. The IBC is satisfied if 0 0A  , which assumed to be 
true if the public debt stock tB  and the primary surplus  t tR G  follow a stochastic stationary process. 
If 0 0A   then tB  will not be stationary, implying that public debt at time t cannot be paid back by 
expected future surplus.  
 
 _____________ 
1 A Ponzi-Game is a situation in which an economy borrows funds continuously by issuing a new debt. In this way the economy 
is rolling over it indefinitely without eventually retiring it. It happens when an economy is spending more than it is earning and 
public spending thus permanently exceeds tax revenue (Romer 2006).  
2 Sufficient condition means that fiscal policy could be sustainable even if debt is non-stationary. 
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Trehan and Walsh (1988) argue that if debt stock tB   and primary deficits tS  are integrated of order one 
I(1), and if real interest rates are constant, a necessary and sufficient condition for fiscal sustainability is 
that debt and primary fiscal balances are cointegrated with a (1, -1) vector of cointegration. This can be 
seen by rewriting the government budget equation (1) as follows: 
 
  
1 1
1
t t t t t t
t t t t
B B G rB T
B r B S
 

   
  
       (7) 
 
In (7), if tB  is a stationary process then the change in debt 1t t tB B B     must also be stationary by 
definition. This implies that the overall balance 1( )t t tr B S   is stationary, and that if the interest rate is 
constant, tB  and tS  are cointegrated with a cointegrating vector (1, -1). In short, if cointegration tests 
suggest that debt and primary fiscal balances are cointegrated then fiscal policy is sustainable (Chalk and 
Hemming 2000). In their subsequent paper, Trehan and Walsh (1991) extend their (1998) work by 
relaxing the constancy of interest rate and suggest that a sufficient condition for fiscal policy 
sustainability is that the total budget surplus (not the primary surplus) should be I(0), irrespective of the 
time series properties of the interest rate (Green et al., 2000). 
 
Hakkio and Rush (1991) reformulated equation (2) with total government expenditure (i.e. government 
expenditure including interest payments) on the left hand side as follows 
 
  1 1 10
1
lim
(1 ) (1 )
t k t k t k
t t t t k kk
k
R G B
GG G rB R
r r

  
  

  
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 
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where 1t t tGG G rB    is the total government expenditures (i.e. government expenditure on goods 
and services plus interest payments). If revenues tR  and expenditures tG  are integrated of order one, or 
I(1), so that tR  and tG  are stationary, then 
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t t tkk
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GG R
r
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      (9) 
 
Assuming that 
10
lim 0
(1 )
t k
kk
B
r




leads to the following test equation  
 
  t t tR GG             (10) 
 
Given that tGG  and tR  are both I(1), Hakkio and Rush (1991) define cointegration between government 
revenue and government expenditure as a necessary condition for the IBC, thus fiscal sustainability, to 
hold. Moreover, they also argue that 0 1   is a necessary condition for the term in equation (9) to 
zero. 
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3.3 Government revenue-expenditure nexus 
Literature of public finance offers four competing alternative hypotheses regarding the causal 
relationship between government revenue and expenditure (literature survey, among others, can be 
seen in Darrat, 1998; Payne, 1998; Moalusi, 2004; Westerlund et. al., 2009; Keho, 2010; Elyasi and 
Rahimi).  
First, the tax-and-spend hypothesis—advocated by Friedman (1978) and Buchanan and Wagner 
(1978)—suggests a unidirectional causality running from revenue to expenditure, e.g. changes in 
government revenues would lead to changes in government expenditures. According to Friedman 
(1978), the unidirectional causality from revenue to expenditure is positive, which implies that 
increasing revenue will simply lead to more expenditure. Therefore, reducing taxes is the appropriate 
remedy to budget deficit. On the contrary, Buchanan and Wagner (1978) argue that the causality is 
negative, an increase in revenue as remedy for deﬁcit budgets. On the contrary, Buchanan and Wagner 
(1978) argue that the causality is negative, that increasing government revenue will result in decreasing 
expenditure. Their argument is built on an assumption that public suffer from fiscal illusion. According to 
this assumption, a reduction in taxes will make the public perceive that the cost of government 
programs has fallen and, hence, demand more programs from the government. The increase in demand, 
if undertaken, will result in higher government expenditure and, consequently, higher budget deficit. To 
reduce government expenditures, Buchanan and Wagner favour limiting the ability of the government 
to resort to deficit financing. Therefore, increasing revenue is the appropriate way to reduce budget 
deficit. 
Second, the spend-and-tax hypothesis—advocated by Barro (1974, 1978) and Peacock and Wiseman 
(1979)—suggests a unidirectional causality running from government expenditure to spending, that 
changes in government expenditure would only lead to changes in government revenue. According to 
Peacock and Wiseman (1979), temporary increases in government expenditures due to “crises” can lead 
to permanent increases in government revenues. Meanwhile, Barro (1974, 1978), based on Ricardian 
equivalence proposition, suggests that government borrowing undertaken today will lead to an 
increased tax liability in the future. Thus, under Ricardian equivalence government expenditure is fully 
capitalised by the public in recognition of these increased future tax liabilities.  
Third, the tax-and-spend and spend-and-tax hypothesis (or the fiscal synchronisation hypothesis)—as 
proposed by Musgrave (1966) and Meltzer and Richard (1981)—suggests a bidirectional causality 
between government revenues and expenditures. According to this hypothesis, the revenue and 
expenditure decisions are made simultaneously by analysing costs and benefits of alternative 
government programs. 
Finally, the institutional separation hypothesis—advocated by Wildavsky (1988) and Baghestani and 
McNown (1994)—suggests the possibility of independence determination of revenues and expenditures 
due to institutional separation of allocation and taxation functions of government. Therefore, this view 
precludes unidirectional causation from revenue to spending or from spending to revenue. 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Data 
We use annual data on government debt stock, government expenditure, government revenue, and 
government budget deficit covering the period 1982 - 2010. All variables are scaled to GDP. While 
controlling for GDP, this treatment alleviates the question of whether variables should be in nominal or 
real terms. The data for government revenue, expenditure, deficit, and GDP are collected from Key 
Indicators for Asia and the Pacific published by Asian Development Bank (ADB) 3, while the data for 
public debt stock are taken from the Historical Public Debt Data Base published by the Fiscal Affair 
Department of International Monetary Funds (IMF) 4. 
 
4.2 Sustainability test 
As argued by Trehan and Walsh (1998, 1991), the stationarity of the overall budget deficit is a sufficient 
condition for a sustainable fiscal policy, and this condition is equivalent with the existence of stationarity 
in both the government revenue and expenditure. Therefore, we start the fiscal policy sustainability 
analysis by testing the stationarity of the government revenue and expenditure. If both government 
revenue and expenditure are I(0), then the budget deficit is also I(0), and we can conclude that the 
transversality condition is satisfied, and therefore that fiscal policy is sustainable. If either revenue or 
expenditure is I(0), while the other is I(1), the transversality cannot be satisfied and therefore fiscal 
policy is unsustainable. 
 
If both government revenue and expenditure are I(1), the test for sustainability should be proceeded to 
cointegration test between the two variables. The stationarity of overall budget deficit requires that 
revenue and expenditure be cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1, -β), where β = 1. If 0 < β < 1 then 
the overall budget deficit will be I(1), hence fiscal policy is unsustainable.  
 
We apply two types of unit root tests. The first type includes the conventional unit root tests of 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test, and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and 
Shin (KPSS). These conventional unit root tests are well-known for their bias towards nonrejection of the 
null hypothesis of nonstationarity (or unit root) in the presence of structural breaks and low power of 
near-integrated process (Perron, 1989). Meanwhile, the KPSS stationary test suffers from size distortions 
in the presence of structural breaks and tends to over-reject the true null hypothesis of stationarity (Lee 
et al, 1997).  The second type of unit root used allows for a break in the series and is the Zivot-Andrews 
(1992) unit root test (ZA test).  
 
 
 
_____________ 
3 
http://www.adb.org/publications/series/key-indicators-for-asia-and-the-pacific 
4
 http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=DEBT 
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4.2.1 Conventional stationarity tests 
 
The ADF test for checking stationarity properties of a time series variable, for instance yt, involves the 
estimation of alternative specifications of the following general equation: 
 
  0 1 1
1
k
t t j t j t
j
y T y y     

             (11) 
 
where 0  is a constant,   denotes the difference operator, T  denotes the time trend, and t  is the 
error term assumed to be covariance stationary. The null hypothesis of the ADF test is that the variable 
ty  is a nonstationary 0( : 0)H   which is rejected if   is significantly negative ( : 0)aH   . If the 
calculated ADF statistic is higher than McKinnon’s critical values, then the hull hypothesis is not rejected 
and the series is nonstationary or not integrated of order zero I(0). Alternatively, rejection of the null 
hypothesis implies stationarity. 
 
The PP unit root test involves estimating a non-augmented version of regression (11); i.e., without the 
lagged difference terms.  The PP unit root test uses a non-parametric method to control for serial 
correlation under the null hypothesis.  The null and alternative hypotheses in PP test are the same as in 
the ADF test. However, PP unit root test is based on its own statistic and corresponding distribution 
(Phillips, 1987; Phillips and Perron, 1988).  
 
Finally, the KPSS uses a similar (though parametric) autocorrelation  correction to the PP but assumes 
that the observed time series can be decomposed into the  sum of a deterministic trend, a random walk 
with zero variance and a stationary error term. It thus tests the null hypothesis of trend stationarity 
corresponding to the hypothesis that the variance of the random walk equals zero (Kwiatkowski et al, 
1992). We consider using the KPSS test as a complement for the ADF and PP tests in which the null 
hypothesis of KPSS test is that a series is stationary.  
 
 
4.2.2 Zivot-Andrews stationarity test with a structural break 
 
The Zivot-Andrews’ (1992) unit root test (ZA test) is a variation of Perron’s (1989) original test. The 
difference is that in the ZA test the break in a time series is estimated endogenously, rather than 
exogenously determined. There are three alternative models of the ZA test in relation with three 
possible ways that a break can appear in a time series: (1) Model A which permits a one-time change in 
the level (intercept) of the series; (2) Model B, which allows for a one-time changes in the slope of the 
trend function, and; (3) Model C, which combines one-time changes in the level and the slope of the 
trend function of the series. We decide to use Model C which is less restrictive and is the most 
comprehensive compared to Model A and Model B. Moreover, Perron (1997) argue that most 
macroeconomic time series can be adequately modelled using either model A or model C. However, as 
suggested by Sen (2003), if model A is used when in fact the break occurs according to model C then 
there will be a substantial loss in test power. Meanwhile, if break is charaterised according to model A, 
but model C is used then the loss in power is minor. Therefore, model C is superior to model A. Model C 
of ZA unit root test is as follows: 
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  1
1
k
t t t j t j t
j
y c y t DU DT d y     

             (12) 
 
where tDU  is an indicator dummy variable for a mean shift occurring at each possible break-date (TB ) 
and tDT  is corresponding trend shift variable. Formally, 1tDU   if t TB  and 0tDU   if otherwise. 
Meanwhile tDT t TB   if t TB  and 0tDT   if otherwise. The null hypothesis is 0  , which implies 
that ty  contains a unit root with a drift that excludes any structural break. Meanwhile, the alternative 
hypothesis is 0   which implies that the series is a trend stationary process with a one-time break 
occurring at an unknown point in time.  
 
The ZA test identifies endogenously the point of the single most significant break-date (TB) in every time 
series being examined. Specifically, the ZA test considers every point as potential break-date and runs a 
regression for every possible break-date sequentially. From among all possible break-dates, the ZA test 
selects as its choice of break-date which minimises the one-sided t-statistic for testing 0  . The 
knowledge about the break point is central for accurate evaluation of any programs or events that bring 
about structural  
 
 
4.3 Revenue and expenditure causality test 
 
4.3.1 Granger causality/Block exogeneity Wald test 
 
To test the causality between government revenue and expenditure we follow the intuitive notion of a 
variable’s forecasting ability due to Granger (1969): if a variable, or group of variables, tx  is found to be 
helpful for predicting another variable, or group of variables, ty  then tx  is said to Granger-cause ty ; 
otherwise it is said to fail to Granger-cause ty . 
 
The Granger causality test involves estimating the vector autoregression (VAR) system which in general 
can be written as the following: 
 
  -
1
, 1,2, ,
p
t i t i t
i
y c t T

   Φ y L       (13) 
 
where 1 2( , , , ) 't t t mty y yy L  is a ( 1)m  vector of jointly determined endogenous variables,   iΦ  is 
( )m m  coefficient matrices, p is order of lag, and t  is a ( 1)m  vector of innovations and is a white 
noise process. For the purpose of this paper,  , 't t tgr gey  where tgr  is the government revenue to 
GDP ratio and tge  is the government expenditure to GDP ratio.  
 
Based on the VAR, the Granger causality between revenue and expenditure can be tested by applying 
the Block exogeneity Wald test (Enders, 2003). This test detects whether the lags of one variable can 
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Granger cause any other variables in the VAR system. The null hypothesis is that all lags of one variable 
can be excluded from each equation in the VAR system. The test statistic is 
 
  2( 3 1)(log log ) (2 )re unT p p     :      (14) 
 
where T is the number of observation, re  is variance/covariance matrices of the restricted system,  un  
is variance/covariance matrices of the unrestricted VAR system, and p is the number of lags of the 
variable that is excluded from the VAR system. 
 
Based on the Granger causality/Block exogeneity Wald test, we can obtain the information about the 
direction of causality between variables, but we do not know whether the causality is negative or 
positive. To answer this question we analyse the impulse-response function, that is a function that 
measures the time profile of the effect of shocks at given point in time on the (expected) future values 
of variables in a dynamic system (Shin and Pesaran, 1998).  
 
 
4.3.2 Impulse response analysis 
 
To check whether the causality between revenue and expenditure is positive or negative, we employ the 
generalised impulse response function (GIR), which originally proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and further 
developed by Shin and Pesaran (1998) for linear multivariate models. To calculate impulse responses we 
need the vector moving average representation of (13) which simply is: 
 
  
0
, 1,2, ,t i t i
i
t T



 y A L        (15) 
 
where iA  is ( )m m coefficient matrices which can be calculated recursively by using 
 
  
1
, 1,2,...
p
i p i p
i
i

 A Φ A        (16) 
 
with 0 mA I  and 0i A  for 1i  .  
 
The impulse-response function of ty  can be formally defined as 
 
  1 1 1( , , ) ( | , ) ( | )y t t n t t t n tGIR n E h E      h Z y Z y Z     (17) 
 
where n is the number of time periods ahead, 1( , , ) 'mh hh L  is ( 1)m  vector of the size of shock to 
variable k, 1tZ  is the known history of the economy from the past up to time 1t  . According to 
equation (17), the generalised impulse response for the vector ty , n period ahead, is the difference of 
the expected value of t my  when taking the shock h into account.  
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The choice of vector of shocks h is crucial to the properties of the impulse response function. Sims 
(1980) suggests to use the orthogonalised impulse response (OIR) by identifying h through using the 
Cholesky decomposition of 'Σ PP , where P is ( )m m  lower triangular matrix. In this context, the 
orthogonalised impulse response function for a unit shock is 
 
  ( ) , 0,1,2,j n jOIR n n A Pe L        (18) 
 
where je  is ( 1)m   selection vector with unity as its j-th element and zero elsewhere. The OIR function 
is critised because the results depend on the orthogonality assumption and they differ with ordering 
choice. 
 
The generalised impulse response function developed by Koop et al. (1996) and Shin and Pesaran (1988) 
use (17) directly by introducing shock only to one element of t , says the j-th element, and integrate out 
the effects of other shock using an assumed or the historically observed distribution of the errors. In this 
case, the generalised impulse response can be written as 
 
  1 1 1( , , ) ( | , ) ( | )y j t t n jt j t t n tGIR n h E h E      Z y Z y Z     (19) 
 
If the errors are correlated, a shock to one error will be associated with changes in the other errors. 
Assuming Gaussian innovations, (0, )t N Σ: , the conditional expectation of the shock equals: 
 
  1 11 2( | ) ( , , , ) 't jt j j j mj jj j j jj jE h h h      
    ΣeL     (20) 
 
where je  is an ( 1)m  selection vector with unity as its j-th element and zero elsewhere. Equation (20) 
gives the predictive shock in each error given a shock to jt  based on the typical correlation observed 
historically between the errors.  
 
By setting j ijh   in (20), i.e. measuring the shock by one standard deviation, the GIR function that 
measures the effect of a one standard error shock to the jth equation at time t on expected values of y 
at time t n  is given by 
 
  
1
2( )ij jj n jGIR n 

 A Σe         (21) 
 
These impulse responses can be uniquely estimated and take full account of the historical patterns of 
correlation observed amongst the different shocks. Unlike the OIR function, the results from GIR 
function are invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VAR. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Sustainability test 
We start the sustainability test by testing for the stationarity of the government revenue and 
expenditure variables. The results from the ADF, PP, and KPSS tests are reported in Table 1. The time 
trend is not included in both the ADF and PP tests since it was found insignificant when included. For the 
government revenue, the results from both the ADF and PP tests suggest that we can reject the null 
hypothesis of nonstationarity at 1 percent significance level. The t-statistic values of the ADF and PP 
tests are -5.703 and -5.791 respectively, which are larger than the absolute value of 1 percent critical 
value of -3.689. Meanwhile, the KPSS test results suggests the null hypothesis of stationarity cannot be 
rejected event at 10 percent significance level, and upholds the null hypothesis of stationarity up to 1 
percent significance level.  
 
Table 1: Unit Root Tests for Government Revenue and Expenditure 
Variables 
ADF Test PP Test KPSS Test 
C T Lag t-stat. C T t-stat. C T LM-stat. 
Revenue  Yes No 0 -5.703 Yes No -5.791 Yes No 0.082 (0) 
    
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
   Expenditure Yes No 0 -3.515 Yes No -3.390 Yes No 0.272 (3) 
    
(0.015) 
  
(0.020) 
   Notes: For the ADF and PP tests, C = constant, T = time trend. The decision whether to include C and/or T in the tests is dictated 
by their significance. The lag length is selected based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The numbers in the brackets are the 
p-values of the corresponding t-statistics. For the KPSS test, the numbers in the brackets denote the lag truncation for Bartlett-
Kernel suggested by the method of Newey-West (1987). The critical values at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are respectively 0.739, 
0.463 and 0.347. 
 
For the government expenditure variable, the null hypothesis of nonstationarity can be rejected at 5 
percent significance level by both ADF and PP tests. The t-statistic values of the ADF and PP tests are 
respectively -3.515 and -3.390. Their absolute values are larger than the absolute value of 1 critical value 
of -2.972. Meanwhile, the KPSS test suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of stationarity 
uphold the null hypothesis of stationarity at 5 percent significance level.  
 
Based on the ADF, PP, and KPSS tests, both government revenue and expenditure, as ratios to GDP, are 
stationary. This means that the transversality condition is satisfied, therefore we can conclude that fiscal 
policy in Indonesia during the sample period has been sustainable.  
 
Regarding the previous results, we are interested to test for the stationarity of the overall budget deficit 
and debt ratio. For the debt ratio, the results of unit root tests are ambiguous. The ADF test suggests 
that the null of unit root can be rejected, but only at a low significance level of 10 percent. Meanwhile, 
the PP test suggests that the debt ratio series is nonstationary as the null hypothesis of stationary 
cannot be rejected even at 10 percent significance level. On the other hand, the KPSS test decisively 
asserts that the debt ratio is stationary as the null hypothesis of stationarity cannot be rejected even at 
10 percent significance level.  
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The results for the total deficit-to-GDP ratio show that the null hypothesis of unit root can be rejected by 
both the ADF and the PP tests, but only at a low significance level of 10 percent. Meanwhile, the KPSS 
test can only uphold the null hypothesis of stationary at 10 percent significance level.  
 
 
Table 1: Unit Root Tests for Debt and Deficit 
 
Variable 
  
ADF Test PP Test KPSS Test 
C T Lag t-stat. C T t-stat. C T LM-stat. 
Debt Yes No 1 -2.755 Yes No -0.711 Yes No 0.211 (3) 
    
(0.078) 
  
(0.400) 
   Deficit No No 0 -1.783 No No -1.724 Yes Yes 0.131 (4) 
    (0.071)   (0.080)    
Notes: For the ADF and PP tests, C = constant, T = time trend. The decision whether to include C and/or T in the tests is dictated 
by their significance. The lag length is selected based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The numbers in the brackets are the 
p-values of the corresponding t-statistics. For the KPSS test, the numbers in the bracket denote the lag truncation for Bartlett-
Kernel suggested by the method of Newey-West (1987). The critical values at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are respectively 0.739, 
0.463 and 0.347. 
 
The conflicting results and low power of the conventional unit root tests in the case of debt and deficit 
variables might due to the presence of structural breaks in the data. As can be seen in Figure xxx, there 
is an indication of a structural break in the time series of both the debt and total deficit variables. This 
break is most probably corresponded to the financial crisis in 1997 – 1998. To account for the structural 
break in the time series data, we proceed by testing unit root for debt ratio and total deficit ratio using 
the Zivot-Andrews unit root test. The results are reported in Table 3. The table also shows the time 
when the break occurred. 
 
Table 3: Zivot- Andrews Tests for Unit root for Debt and Deficit (% GDP) 
Variable TB           Lag Verdict 
Debt 1998 0.2437 -0.0018 0.4001 -0.0354 -0.6266 1 Stationary 
  
(7.2014) (-0.5996) (8.9641) (-7.0202) (-10.4781) 
  Deficit 1998 -0.0531 0.0048 -0.0415 -0.0037 -1.0603 0 Stationary 
  
-5.4673 5.4718 -5.4511 -3.6932 -6.1856 
  Note: Numbers in () and [] are respectively t-statistics and p-values 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, the results of Zivot-Andrews unit root test indicate that both the debt and 
total deficit variables are stationary during the period of observation as the null hypothesis of unit root 
can be rejected at 1 percent significance level. Moreover, the Zivot-Andrews test suggests that the 
structural break for both debt ratio and total deficit ratio occur in the year 1998, which is the year when 
the country experienced a significance degree of economic turmoil.  
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In summary, the results from the unit root tests show that both government revenue and expenditure 
are stationary, or are I(0). This implies that there exists a long run equilibrium relationship between 
government revenue and expenditure and that they are not drifting to far apart. Therefore, the 
transversality conditio is satisfied and we can conclude that fiscal policy in Indonesia during the sample 
period has been sustainable. This conclusion is supported by the facts that both total  deficit and public 
debt time series are also stationary. 
 
5.2 Granger causality test 
Provided that government revenue and expenditure variables are stationary at levels—which implies 
the existence of long run equilibrium between the two variables—we perform the Granger causality test 
using the data at levels. The following unrestricted VAR system, expressed explicitly, is estimated: 
  0 1 1 1 1t t p t p t p t p tgr gr gr ge ge               L L    (22) 
 
  0 1 1 1 1t t p t p t p t p tge ge ge gr gr               L L    (23) 
 
As the first step, we check for the optimal lag order to be used for the VAR model and then test the 
usual properties of the residuals after the estimation. Table 4 shows that the entire lag order selection 
criteria, consisting of the likelihood ratio (LR), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwartz criterion (SC), 
and Hannan-Quin criterion (HQ), recommend (in case of the small sample) a lag order of 1 while 
estimating an unrestricted VAR system up to a maximum lag order of 4. Therefore, in the next step we 
apply a Granger causality test based on a VAR specification with lag order of 1. The VAR estimation 
results are presented in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 2: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 145.970 NA  3.41E-08 -11.518 -11.420 -11.491 
1 155.513   16.797*   2.20E-08*  -11.961*  -11.669*  -11.880* 
2 156.642 1.806 2.79E-08 -11.731 -11.244 -11.596 
3 158.276 2.353 3.43E-08 -11.542 -10.860 -11.353 
4 161.685 4.363 3.73E-08 -11.495 -10.617 -11.251 
Notes: Endogenous variables are gr and ge. Sample: 1982 – 2010 (25 observations). * indicates lag order selected by the 
criterion. 
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Table 5: VAR Estimates 
    gr ge 
   
gr(-1) -0.023476 -0.681396 
  (0.25945)  (0.33591) 
 [-0.09048] [-2.02852]
ge(-1) -0.042956  0.706925 
  (0.16609)  (0.21503) 
 [-0.25864] [ 3.28751] 
C  0.184217  0.170938 
  (0.03324)  (0.04304) 
 [ 5.54139] [ 3.97150] 
    R-squared  0.007828  0.303235 
 Adj. R-squared -0.071546  0.247493 
 F-statistic  0.098623  5.440044 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 2.47E-08 
 Determinant resid covariance  1.97E-08 
 Log likelihood  168.9564 
 Akaike information criterion -11.63974 
 Schwarz criterion -11.35427 
Sample (adjusted): 1983 2010  
Included observations: 28 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
 
The VAR model broadly satisfies standard requirements. As shown by Figure 3, all the inverse roots of 
AR characteristic polynomials lie inside the unit circle, indicating that the VAR model is stable. Table 6 
and Table 7 show the results from the VAR residual normality test and the VAR residual correlation 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, respectively. With the data from Table 6, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of normality properties, since p-values are 0.990 for skewness, 0.349 for kurtosis, and 0.712 
for the Jarque-Bera test. This provides some support for the hypothesis that residuals from the VAR 
model have a normal distribution. Table 7 shows that we also cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation up to lag 4, since p-values are 0.304, 0.609, 0.503, and 0.406 respectively. These 
normality and autocorrelation tests give support to the assumption of our model about white noise 
residuals.  
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Figure 3: Inverse roots of AR polynomial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: VAR Residual Normality Test 
Component Skewness Chi-sq df p-value 
1 0.049 0.011 1 0.915 
2 -0.042 0.008 1 0.927 
Joint 
 
0.020 2 0.990 
     Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df p-value 
1 1.767 1.772 1 0.183 
2 2.464 0.335 1 0.563 
Joint 
 
2.108 2 0.349 
     Component Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
 1 1.784 2 0.410 
 2 0.344 2 0.842 
 Joint 2.128 4 0.712 
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Table 7: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Test 
Lags LM-Stat p-value 
1 4.838 0.304 
2 2.702 0.609 
3 3.339 0.503 
4 3.997 0.406 
p-value from chi-square with 4 df. 
 
Table 8 shows the result of Granger causality test based on the previously specified VAR model. The 
Granger causality block exogeneity Wald test suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
excluding revenue in the expenditure equation at 5 percent significance level due to the fact that 2  = 
4.11  and p-value = 0.043. Therefore, revenue Granger causes expenditure. On the contrary, we can 
reject the null hypothesis of excluding the expenditure in the revenue equation because p-value = 0.799 
for the 2  = 0.067 is larger than 10 percent significance level. Based on the Granger causality test 
results we conclude that there exists a unidirectional causality running from revenue to expenditure 5. 
However, we do not know whether the causality is positive or negative. To answer this question, we 
then proceed to the impulse-response analysis.  
 
 
Table 3: Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Test 
 
Dependent variable Excluded Chi-sq. df p-value 
grt get 0.0669 1 0.7959 
get grt 4.1149 1 0.0425 
Note: Sample: 1982 2010, Included observations: 28 
 
 
5.3 Generalised impulse response 
Figure xxx exhibit the graphical representation of the asymptotic generalised impulse response function. 
Since we use a VAR model with 2 endogenous variables then we have 4 different graphical 
representations of impulse response functions: Panel A, B, C, and D. Each panel shows the dynamic 
response of each variable to a one standard deviation shock on itself and other variable. In each panel, 
the horizontal axis presents the four years following the shock, while the vertical axis measures the 
yearly impact of the shock on each endogenous variable. 
 
_____________ 
5 
Our empirical result is, for example, in line with that of Narayan and Narayan (2006) for El Salvador, Haiti, Chile and 
Venezuela, Narayan (2005) for Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Nepal, and with that of Wolde-Rufael (2008) for Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Mali and Zambia. 
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Firstly, Panel A and B respectively show that a shock in revenue significantly leads to higher revenue and 
higher expenditure in the short run, but we can observe that the effect of revenue on expenditure is 
seemed to be stronger. As can be seen in Panel B, the effect of revenue on expenditure is always 
positive after the first period, while Panel A shows that the effect on revenue becomes slightly negative 
after the first period. The fact that a shock in revenue significantly affects expenditure is a support for 
the results of the causality test. 
Next, Panel C and D respectively show that a shock to expenditure significantly leads to higher 
expenditure and higher revenue in the short run. The fact that expenditure significantly affects the 
revenue conflicts with the previous causality test where expenditure does not Granger cause revenue. 
However, we can observe that the positive effect of revenue on expenditure (Panel B) seems to be 
stronger than the effect of expenditure on revenue (Panel C). Therefore, we prefer the result from 
causality test, and conclude that expenditure does not Granger cause revenue. 
The results of the generalised impulse responses confirm the previous causality test that there is a 
unidirectional causality running from revenue to expenditure. Moreover, the impulse responses show 
that the causality is positive. This reveals that fiscal authorities in Indonesia behave in accordance with 
Friedman’s (1978) tax and spend hypothesis, since an increase in revenue would result in even higher 
expenditure. Since the effect of a shock to revenue on expenditure is stronger than the effect on 
revenue then an increase in revenue would also result in a worsening of budget deficit. Therefore, 
increasing revenue is not a viable way to curtail government deficit. This implies that curtailing the 
government deficit should probably be performed via a fiscal adjustment by reducing reductions in 
expenditure rather than increasing revenue. 
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Figure 4: Generalised Impulse Response 
Response to Generalised One S.D. Innovations ±2 S.E. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
We have examined the fiscal policy sustainability in Indonesia. After highlighting the development in 
some major fiscal variables—i.e. revenue, expenditure, deficit and debt—we use the intertemporal 
budget constraint (IBC) framework to study the issue of fiscal policy sustainability in Indonesia. The 
empirical findings from testing the stationarity properties of the variables suggest that both the 
government revenue and expenditure are stationary at level, which implies that the transversality 
condition is satisfied and, therefore, the fiscal policy during the sample period is sustainable. The 
stationarity properties of deficit and public debt also give support to this conclusion. We then proceed 
to the causality test and impulse response analysis to see the dynamic relationship between 
government revenue and expenditure to identify a viable way to curtail the government budget deficit. 
From the causality test and impulse responses we find that there is a positive unidirectional causality 
from revenue to expenditure, which is consistent with tax and spend hypothesis advocated by Friedman 
(1978). This finding indicates that raising revenue would be followed by higher expenditure, therefore 
leading to a worsening of budget deficit. Accordingly, one way to control the budget deficit, and hence 
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avoiding exploding debt to GDP ratio, is by boosting government revenue while restraining expenditure 
such that expenditure grows at a lower rate than revenue. Accordingly, enhancing revenue collection 
efforts and reforms in public expenditure will be crucial. 
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